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More Money, More Problems? 
Can High Pay be Coercive and Repugnant?†
By Sandro Ambuehl, Muriel Niederle, and Alvin E. Roth*
Sometimes two people would voluntarily 
agree to transact a good or service for com-
pensation, but an unaffected third party would 
prefer to prevent this transaction. Paid kidney 
donation, prostitution, and paid participation in 
medical trials are examples. We use a vignette 
study to explore how respondents’ assessments 
of such repugnant transactions change as we 
alter the seller’s compensation.1 We then sketch 
a model of how people judge the ethics of such 
transactions.2
We focus on transactions involving two par-
ties, for which there are no material negative 
externalities.3 By considering a single trans-
action we abstract from general equilibrium 
effects (cf. Basu 2007). We focus on the seller 
of the good and not the buyer.
1 We defer the harder question of why transacting one 
good or service is widely viewed as repugnant whereas a 
closely related transaction is not (e.g., surrogate motherhood 
and external childcare). 
2 Repugnant transactions have been studied in the moral 
philosophy literature. Examples include Satz (2010) and 
Sandel (2012). Roth (2007) views repugnant transactions 
from a market design perspective. Due to the dearth of 
empirical data, we ran the survey before developing the 
model. 
3 A transaction exerts no material externalities on a third 
party C if C cannot infer whether or not it occurred, unless 
an external source informs him about it. In particular, given 
C’s ex ante beliefs about the likelihood of the transaction, 
C’s utility is unaffected by its occurrence unless he learns 
about it through an external source. 
I. Survey
Our survey concerns paid participation in 
medical experiments. The extant regulatory 
literature cautions against substantial mone-
tary compensation for participation, particu-
larly for the socioeconomically disadvantaged. 
According to the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission (2001), “benefits threaten … the 
voluntary nature of the choice, … raise … the 
danger that the potential participant’s dis-
tributional disadvantage could be exploited [and] … lead some prospective participants to 
enroll … when it might be against their better 
judgment and when otherwise they would not do 
so.” The medical ethics guidelines of jurisdic-
tions as diverse as the European Union, India, 
and Kenya contain such language.
For economists, these arguments are hard to 
understand. According to revealed preference 
theory, enlarging an agent’s choice set can only 
make him better off. Hence preventing transac-
tions that have no negative material externalities 
cannot improve welfare.
We wish to understand whether there is a 
widespread perception in the population that 
high payments for participation in clinical tri-
als are indeed ethically inappropriate, and if so, 
why?
We presented 1,445 subjects on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk with a fictitious medical trial 
that compensates participants with $50, $1,000, 
or $10,000. We described it as a test for  side 
effects of a vaccine that requires a total of 40 
hours of a participant’s time, and characterized 
it as low but nonzero risk. Each respondent 
was randomly displayed one of the three pay-
ment amounts and answered several questions, 
including how they would decide as a member 
of the IRB responsible for approving the exper-
iment, before answering the same questions for 
each of the remaining amounts. The last page of 
the survey directly juxtaposed the three payment 
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amounts, as well as the policies of paying $0 
and covering participants’ opportunity costs.4 
Respondents rated the ethical appropriateness of 
each of these.5
Since respondents might not independently 
think of pertinent ethical aspects, we added an 
experimental condition for 55 percent of our 
respondents presenting the following argu-
ment, inspired by Satz (2010), and framed as a 
discussion between the designers of the study: 
“Does … payment … draw people into the 
study … who do not entirely understand what 
they are getting into? … [Is the] decision to par-
ticipate … truly voluntary when a substantial 
payment is offered?” 6
A. Results
We use respondents’ ratings of how ethical is 
each payment to categorize them as one of three 
types. “Economists” rate a payment of $10,000 
strictly more ethical than a payment of $1,000. 
“Ethicists” make the opposite assessment. The 
remaining subjects rate both equally.7 When (no) arguments were provided, (57 percent and 
14 percent) 34 percent and 27 percent of respon-
dents were “economists” and “ethicists,” respec-
tively. We now show that “ethicists” on the IRB 
would reject the experiment more when the 
highest payment was offered, and feel that high 
payments damage decision making.
Figure 1 plots respondents’ reactions to vary-
ing payment amounts separately for “econo-
mists” and “ethicists.” We use only the first 
stage of the survey, and hence each respondent 
appears only for one payment amount. We pool 
data over the two treatments.8
4 Israel reimburses living organ donors with an amount 
of money equal to 40 days of the donor’s average income 
during the three months prior to donation. 
5 We use only the ordinal information contained in these 
ratings. 
6 In the direct juxtaposition, these respondents addition-
ally read: “… the Institute might entice women to participate 
in the study who don’t fully understand what they are getting 
into. … might lead people to participate in the study who 
would not otherwise choose to do so.” The full text of the 
survey is in the online Appendix. 
7 Subjects saw both payment amounts which referred 
to the same hypothetical medical trial. Hence differential 
responses cannot be caused by differential inference about 
the riskiness of the trial. 
8 The results are directionally the same on either subsam-
ple (see the online Appendix). 
Both types believe higher payments are more 
effective incentives ( p < 0.1), and agree on the 
sign of the comparative statics of raising pay-
ment from $50 to $1,000 on all questions.9 
They differ in assessing the effects of raising 
incentives to $10,000. “Ethicists” think very 
high incentives make participants who enroll 
more likely to subsequently regret their decision ( p < 0.01), consistent with the hypothesis that 
very high incentives may lead to worse decision 
making. They think more prospective partici-
pants would be better off if they had never seen 
the offer to participate in this case ( p < 0.01). 
They also consider the decision to accept less 
voluntary ( p = 0.01) when very high incentives 
are offered. The opposite comparative statics 
apply to “economists” ( p < 0.05 in all cases). 
Consistent with this, “ethicists” (“economists”) 
state that as a member of the IRB they would 
approve the study less (more) if the incentive is 
$10,000 rather than $1,000 ( p < 0.01 for both 
types).10
9 A majority of both “economist” and “ethicist” types 
consider some form of payment more ethical than purely 
voluntary participation (94 percent and 66 percent, respec-
tively); disagreement mainly concerns the appropriate 
amount. 
10 This variable is different from the one used to define 
the types, and hence shows the individual consistency of the 
types. In within rather than across subjects data, both types 
think that very high payments decrease the voluntariness of 
the choice (but “ethicists” much more so than “economists”) 
and the likelihood of regret after having enrolled into the 
trial (but “ethicists” much less so than “economists”). 
Figure 1. Responses of “Economists” and “Ethicists”
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Respondents’ own characteristics are predic-
tive of their type. In a joint regression, higher 
income, education, and age all increase the like-
lihood a respondent is an “ethicist” ( p < 0.1, 
0.05, and 0.05, respectively). The 56 percent of 
respondents who have “thought about partici-
pating in a medical research study as a means to 
earn money” are more likely “ethicists” than our 
other subjects ( p < 0.05).11
II. Sketch of a Model
A prospective seller  s is offered  ¯  m units of 
money in exchange for an amount  ¯  x of a good 
such as health, and can freely decide to accept 
or reject. An observer  o who is richer than 
any seller judges the ethicality of the offer by 
judging the expected welfare of a participant. 
Agent  i ’s endowment is  (h,  m i ) and his utility 
from h units of health and  m units of money is 
 U i (h,  m i ) =  a i u(h) + v( m i ) with  v′(·) > 0 and 
v′′(·) < 0, i ∈ {s, o} . There is heterogeneity in 
both  a i and  m i . The distribution of sellers who 
participate is the population distribution condi-
tional on being willing to participate.
While the observer is able to correctly pre-
dict the seller’s behavior, he does not assume 
that choice is utility maximizing. Instead, he 
partially takes the seller’s perspective, and asks 
how he would feel if he had to live with the sell-
er’s choice. Hence the observer is (partially) 
paternalistic in his assessment of the welfare 
of the seller. Formally, he judges welfare from 
the point of view of someone with monetary 
endowment  m ρ = ρ  m s + (1 − ρ) m o , where ρ ∈ (0, 1) .12 Assessed welfare is  w( ¯  h ,  ¯  m ) =  a s u(h −  ¯  h ) + v( m ρ +  ¯  m ) . The ethicality of 
the transaction is  e( ¯  h ,  ¯  m ) = E[w( ¯  h ,  ¯  m ) − 
w(0, 0) |  U s (h −  ¯  h ,   m s +  ¯  m ) ≥  U s (h,    m s )] . The 
transaction is considered repugnant if  e < 0 .13
11 Fourteen percent of those subjects report having partic-
ipated in a clinical trial. This has no additional effect on the 
likelihood of being an “ethicist.” 
12 In the online Appendix we study the case in which the 
observer also only partially takes the seller’s perspective 
regarding the preference parameter  a . 
13 Offering a transaction to a prospective seller can be 
unethical only if the observer judges the seller according 
to a standard different from the one he uses to predict his 
behavior. Plainly, partial perspective taking implies that the 
observer would never participate in a transaction that he 
finds repugnant, but may refuse to participate in a transac-
tion that he does not find repugnant. 
A. Implications
We first study the effects of incentivizing 
a given seller, and then consider selection. 
Suppose the seller is offered a transaction he is 
just willing to accept. As the observer assesses 
welfare from the point of view of someone with 
a lower marginal utility of money, he thinks 
that the seller loses from accepting this trans-
action. Hence, he judges offering this transac-
tion to the seller as repugnant. This shows that 
money is considered repugnant to the extent 
that it incentivizes the transaction, not per se. 
Indeed, paying the seller more for providing 
the same amount  ¯  h is judged as more ethical. 
Both results are in line with the ethics literature 
cited above.
Incentivizing the sale of a larger amount  ¯  h is 
judged as less ethical.14 The observer thinks that 
the seller loses from a transaction that makes 
him indifferent. The larger the payment needed 
to make him indifferent, the more he loses. 
This comparative static is stronger for richer 
observers.
Incentivizing poorer sellers is judged as 
less ethical (if v has non-increasing absolute 
risk-aversion) since the observer disagrees with 
poorer sellers more about the marginal value 
of money. This explains why medical ethics 
guidelines are particularly concerned about 
incentivizing socioeconomically disadvantaged 
populations. And  e is decreasing in the observ-
er’s endowment because richer observers take 
the seller’s perspective to a lesser extent when 
assessing welfare.
Regarding market design, the model implies 
that in-kind incentives will be judged as most 
ethical.15 Once there is no trade-off between 
good h and money, there is no scope for disagree-
ment about the appropriate rate of substitution. 
The model also explains why 73 percent of our 
survey respondents consider remunerating sub-
jects with the opportunity costs as worse than (at least one of) paying $1,000 or $10,000.16 
14 Formally, increasing  ¯  h and varying  ¯  m such that the 
seller’s utility from accepting the transaction is unchanged 
decreases  e . All proofs are in the online Appendix. 
15 In-kind compensation occurs, for example, in kidney 
exchange. A richer model would introduce room for dis-
agreement by allowing the observer’s preferences for good  h 
to differ from the seller’s. 
16 87 percent and 69 percent amongst “economist” and 
“ethicist” subjects, respectively. 
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Starting from two prospective sellers with 
 different endowments  m 1 <  m 2 who are given 
the respective least amount of money  ¯  m 1 <  ¯  m 2 
that just makes them participate,  ¯  m 1 can be 
increased to  ¯  m 2 without affecting any participa-
tion decisions. Since high payments are viewed 
as unethical only to the extent they serve as 
incentives, this raises  e .
When allowing for selection, increasing 
incentives for selling a given amount  ¯  h has 
three effects: (i) sellers who would have partic-
ipated anyway now receive a larger consumer 
surplus; (ii) richer sellers, who would not have 
participated before, now do; (iii) sellers with 
higher utility weight  a s on good h now partici-
pate. The first two effects increase e. The third 
is akin to incentivizing a larger transaction and 
decreases e. The total effect depends on the pop-
ulation distribution of  a s and  m s , and can take 
the hump shape observed for “ethicist” survey 
respondents.
A promising direction for further empirical 
research may be to study the attitudes of subjects 
drawn from the same population as  potential 
participants in a study. An IRB might wish to 
know if people with the same income as the par-
ticipants of concern feel that high incentives are 
repugnant.
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